Nė qoftė se njė mik ose njė njeri i cili ka nė vetvete hyjni vritet, gjaku i prishur gjykohet tė jetė gjak i zotit. Njerėzit kanė detyrime etike pėr tė asnjanėsuar gjakun e zotit duke ofruar njė saktificė tė barazvlershme mė tė. E vetmja gjė qė ėshtė e barazvlershme me gjakun e zotit ėshtė gjaku i vrasėsit, ose i njė anėtari tė grupit tė tij farefisnor, i cili gjithashtu zotėron vetė hyjni. Mė tej, gjaku i tė vrarit, i cili vajtohet sepse vrazhdėsia e vrasėsit ndėrpreu lidhjet e tij tė gjakut me paraardhėsit dhe pasardhėsit, bėn thirrje pėr hakmarrje. Shpriti i njė njeriu tė vrarė kurrė nuk pushon i qetė deri sa gjaku i tij do tė merret. (DURHAM 1979 [1928]: 162-171). Idea se zemėrimi i tė vrarit dhe sakrilegji i tmerrshėm, pėr shembull derdhja e gjakut tė zotit, duhet tė asnjanėsohet nėpėrmjet njė sakrifice tė njėvlefshme tė gjakut, ėshtė baza etike e hakmarrjes dhe e rezultantes sė saj gjakmarrjes. Njė konstrukt i ngjashėm mund tė zbatohet edhe pėr Nderin. Kur njė njeri i cili ka tė mishėruara nė vetvete hyjni ēnderohet, konceptohet se nderi i zotit ėshtė dhunuar. Turpėrimi i zotit, i cili nė kėtė rast shoqėrohet me tėrbim dhe kėrkim hakmarrjeje, duhet tė asnjanėsohet nėpėrmjet ofrimit tė njė sacrifice gjaku, ashtu sikurse ėshtė treguar nė figurėn nr.1. Sakrifica mė e pėrshtatshme pėr tė paqėsuar zotėrit ėshtė gjaku i ofenduesit, ose i njė anėtari tė grupit tė tij farefisnor, tė cilėn pala e ofenduar ofron.

Etika dhe rendi shoqėror nė Shqipėrinė Veriore

Njerėzit nė Shqipėrinė Veriore jetojnė nė shoqėri fisnore, e cila konsiston nė grupe farefisnore tė organizuara nė formė patrimoniale tė quajtura shpi-vllazni-fis. Nė kėtė shoqėri, njė individ jeton si njė anėtar i njė grupi farefisnor. Tė drejtat e tij individuale dhe liria e vullnetit janė disi tė kufizuara dhe ai pritet tė pėrmbushė detyrimet e grupit farefisnor, tė cilat pėrfshijnė tė vdekurit (paraardhėsit) e prejardhjes familjare. Nė qoftė se njė individ merr lavdėrime, ai ėshtė lavderim pėr grupin e tij farefisnor. Nė qoftė se ndonjė njeri, i gjallė apo i vdekur, fyhet, kjo ėshtė njė fyerje kundėr tėrė grupit farefisnor. Njė ēnderim i tillė duhet tė shpaguhet me hakmarrje nga tė gjallėt e grupit farefisnor.

Aktet e hakmarrjes janė tė rregulluara prej Kanunit, struktura etike e tė cilit pėrmblidhet si mė poshtė: 1) njė mik ėshtė njė lloj zoti ose njė lajmėtar i zotėrve; 2)Ngėnia e pėrbashkėt e ushqimit e njė mikpritėsi me njė mik-zot ėshtė njė ritual pėr tė, pėr tė bėrė njė bashkim me mikun zot; 3) mikpritėsi bėhet hyjnor pėrmes ngrėnies sė ushqimit me mikun-zot dhe pėrmes njė bekimi tė shqiptuar prej mikut-zot. 4) Betimi, besa, nderi dhe gjaku i njė personi (mikpritėsi), i cili fiton hyjni nga miku-zot janė tė njėvlershme me ato tė zotėrve; 5) kur njė person humbet hyjninė pėr veten e tij ose ndaj tė tjerėve nėpėrmjet kryerjes sė mekateve tė sakrilegjeve si pėr shembull mosmbajtjes sė betimit ose njė bese, fyerjes sė mikut etj.., hyjnia e dėmtuar duhet tė asnjanėsohet duke ofruar gjakun e ofenduesit, ose njė anėtari tė grupit tė tij farefisnor, pėr tė qetėsuar zemėrimin e zotėrve tė tėrbuar. Gjaku i therorizuar i palės ofenduese gjykohet tė jetė i njėvlefshėm me atė tė zotėrve. Ėshtė e qartė se konceptet etike tė Kanunit, tė tilla si " Besa", "Gjaku", "Nderi", "Ushqimi" dhe "Miku" i kanė fillesat e tyre nė besimet pagane, tiparet kryesore tė tė cilėve janė animizmi dhe adhurimi i parardhėsve. Durhami raportonte se popullsia e Veriut tė Shqipėrisė besonte nė shpirtrat tė tillė si Ora, dhe kishte shumė besime parakristiane tė tillė si Syni i keq, ashtu sikurse edhe Adhurimi i paraardhėsve (DURHAM 1979[1928]: 121-131, 225-228, 243-258, 263-284).

Fiset e Shqipėrisė Veriore kanė njė mekanizėm shoqėror i cili ndėrmjetėson dhe shuan konflikte nė mes individėve ose grupeve farefisnore, procedurat e tė cilave janė tė diktuara prej Kanunit (GJEÇOV 1989 [1933]: 188-200, HASLUCK 1954: 139-147, 164-201). Ndėrmjetėsit zakonisht janė pleqtė e njė fshati tė cilėt bėjnė pėrpjekje pėr tė zgjidhur mosmarrėveshjet nėpėrmjet procedurave juridike. Megjithatė, ndėrmjetėsit nuk kanė asnjė fuqi tė autorizuar pėr tė imponuar vendimet e tyre mbi palėt nė grindje. Nėse ato i pranojnė ose jo vendimet, kjo ėshtė njė ēėshtje qė i pėrket tėrėsisht vetė palėve nė konflikt. Kur palėt nė konflikt nuk pranojnė vendimet juridike, mosmarrėveshja pėrfundon nė gjakderdhje. Dhe kur njė person kryen njė ofendim serioz, tė cilin Kanuni e gjykon tė jetė absolutisht joetik, pala e ofenduar hakmerret mbi ofenduesin ose mbi grupin e tij farefisnor, ndėrsa Kanuni i lejon njė personi tė paguajė para ose mallra si kompensim pėr dėmin, kur ofendimet e tij janė relativisht tė vogla,

Meqenėse Kanuni rregullon nė mėnyrė tė rreptė gjakmarrjet nė tė cilat palėt nė armiqėsi hakmerren nė mėnyrė alternative, ato konflikte rrallė kalojnė nė beteja nė shkallė tė gjėrė dhe grupet e tjera farefisnore supozohet tė mos pėrfshihen nė to. Kanuni ka edhe shumė nene nė tė cilat pėrcaktohet se si pajtohet gjakmarrja. Ekzistojnė tė ashtuquajturit ndėrmjetės tė pajtimit tė gjakut nė bashkėsi, tė cilėt vullnetarisht bashkėbisedojnė dhe ndėrmjetėsojnė pajtimin nė mes palėve nė gjak nė pėrputhje me rregullat e Kanunit. (GJEÇOV 1989 [1933]: 182-186, HASLUCK 1954: 256-260). Ritualėt e pajtimit kanė njė pushtet aq tė fuqishėm nė pajtimin e konflikteve, saqė rifillimi i armiqėsisė tė njė gjakmarrjeje tė pajtuar rrallė ndodh.

Nė kėtė mėnyrė, Kanuni ushtron pushtete normative, duke ndrequr aktet e shėmtuara tė njerėzve dhe duke i nxitur ato tė adoptojnė sjellje tė pėrshtatshme shoqėrore. Popullsia nė Shqipėrinė Veriore i referohet Kanunit si njė burim drejtėsie, i cili u mundėson atyre tė ruajnė paqen dhe rendin shoqėror.

Etika dhe rendi shoqėror nė njė shoqėri pagane pa pushtet shtetėror.

Duke folur nė pėrgjithėsi, njerėzit e njė shoqėrie pagane qė praktikojnė adhurimin ndaj paraardhėsve, e ndjejnė se tė vdekurit e grupit farefisnor janė tė njėvlershėm me zotėrit. Nietzsche pėrshkruan procesin se si paraardhėsi i njė grupi familjarė tė rėndėsishėm nė njė shoqėri primitive bėhet njė zot i tmerrshėm. Sipas Nietzsche-s, brenda shoqėrizimit fillestar fisnor, brezat jetėsorė njohin pėrherė njė detyrim ligjor kundrejt brezave paraardhės. Ekziston njė bindje mbizotėruese se fisi ekziston vetėm nė sajė tė sakrificės dhe veprimeve tė stėrgjyshėrve, dhe kjo duhet tė shpėrblehet me sakrifica dhe veprime: njeriu njeh njė detyrim (borxh), i cili vazhdimisht rritet mbasi parardhėsit ekzistojnė nė pėrjetėsi si shprirta tė plotfuqishėm, duke i dhėnė fisit avantazhe tė reja dhe diēka nga pushteti i tyre. Herė pas here ato kėrkojnė pagesa nė shkallė tė gjėrė, diēka shumė tė madhe si pagesė ndaj kreditorėve, e tillė si sakrifica e ulėt e tė lindurit tė parė, pėr shembull gjak, i cili duhet tė jetė gjak njerėzor. Duke ndjekur kėtė linjė mendimi, tmerri i paraardhėsit sė bashku me fuqinė e tij dhe ndėrgjegjėn e borxhit kundrejt tij, rritet nė mėnyrė tė pashmangshme. Nėpėrmjet halucinacioneve tė tmerrit nė rritje, paraardhėsit e fiseve mė tė fuqishme rritėn nė njė stature tė pafundme deri sa paraardhėsi vetė transfigurohet pėrfundimisht nė njė zot. (NIETZSCHE 1994: 65-67).

Kjo mėnyrė e mendimit gjendet nė shumicėn e shoqėrive pagane primitive, ku sistemet e farefisnisė janė tė njė rėndėsie shumė tė madhe. Grupi farefisnor nė njė shoqėri pagane ėshtė ndėrtuar nė mėnyrė tė tillė qė tė jetė njė entitet transhendental, i cili pėrfshin jetėn dhe vdekjen. (LÉVY-BRUHL 1965 [1928]: 70-71, 105). Nė qoftė se tė vdekurit bėhen zotėr (ose paraardhės zotėr) grupi farefisnor supozohet tė jetė njė hyjni, qėnie etike, sepse ajo ėshtė njė bashkėsi e njerėzve tė gjallė dhe e paraardhėsve zotėr. (FRAZER 1981[1890]; II 99). Tė gjallėt duhet tė ofrojnė strehė dhe mikpritje mikut-zot. Nė kėmbim pėr mikpritjen miku-zot i jep bekimin mikpritėsve, fuqija magjike e fjalėve tė tė cilit i siguron lumturinė dhe shendetin e mirė tė gjallėve. Nė jetėn e pėrditshme, tė gjallėt duhet tė ofrojnė ushqim dhe ujė ndaj parardhėsve–zotėr, pėr tė treguar respekt dhe pėr tė mos i lėnė ato tė shkojnė tė uritur dhe tė etur. Nė qoftė se tė gjallėt harrojnė tė ofrojnė ushqim dhe ujė, tė vdekurit zemėrohen deri nė ofendim dhe marrin hak mbi tė gjallėt. Kur i gjalli i pėrmbush besnikėrisht detyrimet, tė vdekurit bėhen rojtarė, qė i japin fat tė mire tė gjallėve dhe parandalojnė ndodhjen e fatkeqėsive. (LÉVY-BRUHL 1965 [1928]: 303-306).

Nė shumicėn e shoqėrive pagane pa pushtet shtetėror, hakmarrja e ndėrmarrė prej palės sė dėmtuar ėshtė sanksioni mė i fundit ndaj njė gabimi qė rrezikon sensin e drejtėsisė nė bashkėsi. Nė qoftė se njė person vritet, gjaku i derdhur qė kėrkon hakmarrje lyp gjakun e gjaksorit ose tė njė anėtari tė grupit tė tij fisnor. Kur tė gjallėt nuk kėnaqin kėrkesėn e tė vdekurve, gjaku i egėrsuar merr hak mbi tė gjallėt. (FRAZER 1920: 129). Prandaj tė gjallėt nuk mund tė dėshtojnė nė perpjekjen pėr tė vrarė hasmin, ēfarė do tė thotė se kjo hakmarrje do tė pėrfundojė nė gjakmarrje. Idea qė njė grup farefisnor, i pėrbėrė nga tė gjallėt dhe tė vdekurit (paraardhės-zotėr) ėshtė njė ide transhedentale, qėnie etike, na shpie ne nė konceptin se dhuna hakmarrėse e ndjekur nga grupi farefisnor ėshtė njė forcė e shenjtė qė sakrifikon gjakun e njė ofenduesi ose tė njė dhunuesi me qellim qė tė qetėsojė paraardhėsit zotėr tė tėrbuar dhe hakmarrės. Nė kėtė kontekst pėrfundohet se hakmarrja ėshtė njė veprim etik, sepse dhuna e saj ėshtė e barazvlershme me forcėn e shenjtė tė drejtėsisė tė dhėnė nga zotėrit. Koncepti i dhunės sakrifikuese ėshtė e vetmja pėrgjigje e qartė ndaj pyetjes, pėrse dhuna e hakmarrjes pėrbėn burimin e drejtėsisė nė njė shoqėri me traditėn e lex talionis.

Teoria e Hobbes mbi origjinėn e rendit shoqėror.

Thomas Hobbes ishte i pari filozof i cili u pėrpoq tė ndriēojė faktin se si u themelua rendi shoqėror nė njė shoqėri pa pushtet shtetėror. Idea e tij mbi kushtin shoqėror tė njė shoqėrie pa pushtet shtetėror pėrbėn bazėn mbi tė cilėn filozofė tė tillė si Rousseau, Nietzsche dhe Girand zhvilluan teoritė e tyre. Nė kėtė punim unė do tė pėrmbledh dhe analizoj teorinė e tij.

Para sė gjithash, Hobbes tregoi se, pėr shkak se njerėzit janė tė gjithė tė barabartė nė aftėsitė e tyre tė trupit dhe mendjes, nga andej lind njė barazi shprese nė arritjen e qellimeve tė tyre. Nė qoftė se dy njerėz dėshirojnė tė njėjtėn gjė, ato bėhen armiq sepse tė dy ato nuk mund ta gėzojnė atė nė tė njejtėn kohė. (HOBBES 1985[1651]: 183-184). Prandaj, gjatė kohės kur njeriu jeton pa pushtet tė pėrbashkėt qė i mundėson respektin ndaj njėri tjetrit, ato janė nė njė rrethanė qė quhet luftė; kjo ėshtė njė rrethanė kur ēdo njėri ėshtė kundėr tjetrit. Nė kėtė kushte nuk ka vend pėr industri (zell pėr punė), sepse frutet janė tė pasigurta dhe si rezultat nuk ka kulturė mbi tokė. Asgjė nuk mund tė jetė e padrejtė, ndėrkaq nocionet "e drejtė" dhe "e gabuar", nocionet e "drejtėsisė" dhe "padrejtėsisė" nuk kanė vend atje. (HOBBES 1985 [1651]: 185-188)

Njė njeri gėzon tė Drejtėn e Natyrės tė quajtur jus naturale, qė do tė thotė lirinė pėr tė pėrdorė pushtetin qė ka pėr ruajtjen e Natyrės sė vet, d.m.th. tė jetės sė tij vetjake, dhe si pasojė, tė bėjė gjithēka qė nė gjykimin dhe arsyen e tij, konceptohet si mjeti mė i pėrshtatshėm. Ai ėshtė gjithashtu nėn rregullin e njė ligji tė Natyrės (lex naturalis) tė zbuluar prej arsyes, nėpėrmjet tė cilit njė njeri ėshtė i ndaluar tė bėjė ēfarė ėshtė shkatėrruese ndaj jetės sė tij dhe hedhė poshtė ēfarė ėshtė mė e mira pėr tė mbrojtur jetėn e tij. Nė kushtet e luftės tė tė gjithėve kundėr tė gjithėve, nuk ka fare siguri pėr kėdo qė tė jetojė jetėn e vet siē lejon natyra zakonisht. Prandaj rregulli themelor i arsyes, se ēdo njeri duhet tė pėrpiqet pėr paqė, pėr sa kohė ai shpreson ta fitojė atė, duhet tė jetė mbizotėrues nė shoqėri nė qoftė se njė njeri ka arsye. Megjithatė, kur ai nuk arrin ta fitojė, mund tė kėrkojė dhe tė pėrdorė tė gjitha pėrfitimet dhe avantazhet qė rrjedhin nga lufta. Nė qoftė se njė njeri lipset tė ndjekė rregullat themelore tė arsyes, ai duhet tė japė tė drejtėn e tij mbi tė gjithė gjėrat dhe tė kėnaqet kaq shumė me lirinė kundėr tė tjerėve, aq sa ai do tė lejonte tė tjerėt kundrejt vetvetės. (HOBBES 1985 [1651]: 189-190).

E drejta mbi tė gjitha gjėrat mund lihet mėnjanė, ose thjesht nėpėrmjet heqjes dorė prej tyre, ose duke e transferuar atė tek njė tjetėr. Transferimi reciprok i sė drejtės konsiderohet si kontratė, e cila ėshtė e nevojshme tė mbėshtetet, ose nėpėrmjet frikės sė pasojave tė thyerjes sė saj, ose si njė sens i lavdisė ose krenarisė nė dukje pėr mos ta thyer atė. Frika e pasojave tė thyerjes sė kontratės ėshtė formuar ose nėpėrmjet pushtetit tė padukshėm tė shpirtrave, ose nėpėrmjet pushtetit tė personave tashmė tė dėmtuar. Hobbes arrin nė pėrfundimin se nga kėto dy tė fundit nuk mund tė jetė fuqia kryesore qė detyron njerėzit t'i mbahen njė kontratė, meqenėse frika e hakmarrjes nuk ekziston tek ēdo njeri (HOBBES 1985[1651]: 190-200). Kėshtu Hobbes, i cili ngul kėmbė se kontrata ėshtė fillesa e rendit shoqėror, nėnvlerėson rėndėsinė e hakmarrjes tė ndjekur nga pala e dėmtuar, pėr tė cilėn ai mendon se nuk ėshtė edhe aq e fuqishme sa ta bėjė njeriun t'i mbahet njė kontrate.

Çėshtjet me tė rėndėsishme tė cilave duhet t'u jepet pėrgjigje nė rastin e diskutimit tė natyrės sė njė shoqėrie pa pushtet shtetėror, janė:

1. A ėshtė e mundur qė njė shoqėri pa pushtet shtetėror tė ketė etikė dhe rend shoqėror?
2. Nė qoftė se kjo ėshtė e mundur, ēfarė lloje etike dhe rendi shoqėror ka njė shoqėri pa pushtet shtetėror?

Nė kėtė kumtesė unė sugjeroj se:

1. Njė shoqėri pa pushtet shtetėror, ku hakmarrja e ndėrmarrė nga pala e dėmtuar ėshtė sanksioni mė i fundit pėr tė ndėshkuar ofenduesin, ka etikė dhe rend shoqėror.
2. Hakmarrja ėshtė njė akt drejtėsie pėr tė rivendosur dhe ruajtur rendin shoqėror, meqenėse ai konsiderohet tė jetė njė forcė e shenjtė e sakrifikimit tė gjakut tė ofenduesit ndaj zotėrve. Kėto ide nuk janė nė pėrputhje me teorinė e Hobbes, i cili e fillon argumentin e tij mbi presupozimin se njė shoqėri pa pushtet shtetėror ka pak rend shoqėror.

Teoria Hobsiane e njė shoqėrie pa pushtet shtetėror ka tre cilėsi: Sė pari, pretendon se njė shoqėri pa pushtet shtetėror ėshtė nė njė situatė ku ēdonjėri ėshtė kundėr tė gjithėve; sė dyti, se kontrata nė mes anėtarėve tė njė shoqėrie ėshtė baza e rendit shoqėror; sė treti, se hakmarrja nuk ėshtė njė forcė edhe aq e fuqishme pėr tė rivendosur dhe ruajtur rendin shoqėror. Siē ėshtė sugjeruar mė herėt nė kėtė punim, njė shoqėri pagane primitive supozohet tė jetė njė agregat i grupeve farefisnore, qė bazohen dhe zhvillohen mbi konceptet fetare tė animizmit dhe tė adhurimit tė paradhėsve. Kur grupet farefisnore u shfaqėn sė pari nė historinė njerėzore, kjo nuk ishte njė entitet dashurie zhvilluar pėrmes ndėrveprimeve personale mes burrave dhe grave, por njė komunė transhedentale dhe fetare nė mes tė gjallėve dhe tė vdekurve. Grupi farefisnor, i cili mund tė jetė komuna e parė kulturore e qėnieve njerėzore, e ka origjinėn e vet nė konceptet fetare tė njė shoqėrie pagane. Mund tė supozohet pa frikė se njė shoqėri pagane primitive qė pėrbėhet nga grupe farefisnore, ka etikė dhe rend shoqėror, cilėsi tė cilat janė zhvilluar nė mėnyrė tė vetvetishme para se njerėzit nė shoqėri tė bėnin kontrata. Unė besoj se teoria a Hobsiane se njė shoqėri pa pushtet shtetėror ėshtė nė njė gjendje lufte tė pėrjetshme, duhet konsideruar si njė terori e paqendrueshme.

Analizat kritike tė teorive tė Rousseau-sė, Nietzsche-s dhe Girard-it.

Kur Hobbes tregoi se njė shoqėri pa pushtet shtetėror ishte nė njė gjendje tė quajtur lufte, dhe se kontrata shoqėrore ishte fillesa e rendit shoqėror, Russeau-ja, Nietzsche dhe Girard diskutuan mėnyrėn se si rendi shoqėror ishte vendosur nė njė shoqėri pa pushtet shtetėror, gjė tė cilėn unė e kritikova nė njė studim paraardhės (YAMAMOTO 1999: 221-229)

1. Teroria e Rousseau-sė mbi origjinėn e rendit shoqėror.

Rousseau shprehet se nė gjendjen primitive, njeriu nuk ka as shtėpi, as kasolle, dhe asnjė lloj pronėsie. Çdonjėri jeton ku mundet, rrallė pėr mė shumė se njė natė tė vetme, seksualisht tė bashkuar pa ndonjė paracaktim, sipas rastėsisė, mundėsisė, ose kur prirjet qė kishin i bashkonin; ata nuk kishin ndonjė nevojė tė madhe pėr fjalėt pėr tė komunikuar tėrheqjet e tyre ndaj njėri tjetrit. (ROUSSEAU 1993[1973]: 65). Pėr sa kohė qė njeriu merr pėrsipėr tė kryejė vetėm atė qė njė person i vetėm mund ta plotėsojė, dhe e kufizon vetvetėn nė zanate tė tilla qė nuk kėrkojnė punėn e pėrbashkėt tė disa duarve, ato jetojnė tė lirė, tė shėndetshėm, tė ndershėm dhe tė lumtur pėr sa kohė qė natyra e atyre ua lejon. Por nga momenti qė njeriut i lind nevoja pėr ndihmėn e njė tjetri, nga momenti kur atij i shfaqen avantazhe pėr tė pasė furnizime pėr dy persona, barazia zhduket, futet nė veprim prona dhe puna bėhet e domosdoshme [ROUSSEAU 1993[1973: 92).

Nė kėtė fazė, ambicia e pangopshme, etja e lartėsimit tė fateve tė tyre respektive, jo edhe aq nga dėshirat reale sa nga dėshira pėr ta tejkaluar tjetrin, frymėzon gjithė njerėzit me prirje tė ulėta pėr tė dėmtuar njėri-tjetrin, madje edhe me xhelozi tė fshehtė, gjė qė ėshtė edhe mė e dėmshme. Me njė fjalė, nga ky moment nga njėra anė lind rivaliteti dhe konkurenca, kurse nga ana tjetėr njė konflikt interesash sė bashku me njė dėshirė tė fshehtė tek tė dy pėr tė pėrfituar nė kurriz tė tė tjerėve. Ndėrmjet pretendimeve tė mė tė fortėve dhe tė punėsuarve tė parė, lindin konflikte tė pėrjetshme, qė asnjėherė nuk mbyllen , pėrveēse me beteja dhe gjakderdhje. (ROUSSAU 1993[1973]: 96-97).

Nė kėtė mėnyrė, kjo gjendje e porsalindur e shoqėrisė shoqėrohet me lindjen e njė gjėndjeje tė tmerrshme lufte. Nė kėtė situate, i pasuri nė veēanti duhet ta ndjejė sa shumė vuan prej njė gjendje tė qėndrueshme lufte, nga e cila ato mbartin gjithė pasojat; dhe nė tė cilėn sadoqė tė gjithė rrezikojnė jetėn e tyre, ato vetėm rrezikojnė pronėn e tyre. Me kėtė pamje, pasi paraqet tek fqinjėt e tij tmerrin e njė situate, nė tė cilėn ēdo njeri armatoset kundėr pjesės tjetėr, nė tė cilėn nuk ka siguri as pėr tė pasurin dhe as pėr tė varfrin, ai trillon argumente tė lavdėrueshme si pėr shembull: "Le tė bashkohemi pėr tė mbrojtur tė dobėtin nga shtypja, tė kufizojmė ambicjet, dhe tė sigurojmė ndaj ēdo njeriu zotėrimin e asaj ēfarė i pėrket; le tė vendosim rregulla tė drejtėsisė dhe paqės, tė cilat tė gjithė pa pėrjashtim duhet tė detyrohemi t'i pranojmė. Le t'i mbledhim forcat tona nė njė fuqi supreme e cila mund tė na qeverisė nėpėrmjet ligjeve tė menēura, mund tė na mbrojė tė gjithė anėtarėt e shoqėrisė, tė zmbrapsė armiqtė tanė tė pėrbashkėt dhe tė mbajė harmoninė e pėrjetshme mes nesh, nė vend qė tė drejtojmė forcat tona kundėr vetvetės (ROUSSEAU 1993[1973]: 97-98). Atėherė vendoset njė institucion politik, i cili shpejt degjeneron nė despotizėm, duke sjellė varfėri nė popull.

Kėshtu Rousseau, nuk arrin tė njohė se njė shoqėri pa pushtet shtetėror ka etikė dhe rend shoqėror. Sipas tij rendi shoqėror themelohet kur njė shoqėri pa pushtet shtetėror zhvillon njė institucion politik.

2. Teoria e Nietzsche-s mbi fillesėn e moralitetit dhe rendit shoqėror.

Nietzsche tregon se para ekzistencės sė shtetit, qeniet njerėzore vrisnin ēdo krijesė, qoftė ai majmun apo njeri, qė kėrkonte t'i mėnjanonte ato nga frutat e pemės, kur qellonte qė ata tė ishin tė uritur, ose kėrkonin ta pėrvetėsonin atė vetė. Para ekzistencės sė shtetit, individi mund tė veprojė me ashpėrsi dhe mizori me qėllim frikėsimin e krijesave tė tjera: tė sigurojė ekzistencėn e tij nėpėrmjet testeve frikė-frymėzuese tė pushtetit qė zotėronte. Sipas Nietzsches-s, moraliteti paraprihet nga detyrimi dhe ky i fundit ėshtė pėr njė kohė vetė ende detyrim, ndaj tė cilit njeriu pėrshtat vetvetėn pėr shmangien e asaj ēfarė ai e konsideron si tė pakėndshme. Mė vonė ajo bėhet zakon, mė vonė akoma bindje e vullnetshme dhe mė nė fund pothuajse instikt. Kėshtu, sikurse gjithēka qė pėr njė kohė tė gjatė ka qenė e zakonshme dhe natyrore, ajo shoqėrohet me kėnaqėsi dhe quhet tani virtyt. (NIETZSCHE 1996[1886]: 53).

Moraliteti nuk ėshtė gjė tjetėr veēse bindja ndaj zakonit, tė ēfarėdolloji qė ai mund tė jetė. Nė gjėrat nė tė cilat nuk komandon fare tradita, nuk ka moralitet; dhe sa mė pak jeta pėrcaktohet nga tradita, aq mė i vogėl ėshtė cikli i moralitetit. Qėnia e lire njerėzore ėshtė e pamoralshme, sepse nė tė gjitha gjėrat ajo ėshtė vendosur tė varet mbi vetvetėn dhe jo mbi traditėn. Fillimisht, gjithė arsimimi dhe kujdesi shendetėsor, martesa, mjeksia, bujqėsia, lufta, fjala dhe heshtja, kėmbehen me njėra tjetrėn dhe me zotėrit dhe pėrfshihen brenda sferės sė moralitetit. Njeriu mė i moralshėm ėshtė ai i cili sakrifikon mė shumė pėr zakonin. (NIETZSCHE 1994: 142-143).

Ai qė bėn ēfarė ėshtė e zakonshme, qoftė prej natyrės apo edhe si rezultat i njė trashėgimie tė gjatė, qė do tė thotė pa zor dhe me kėnaqėsi, quhet "i mirė" dhe kėshtu mbetet ēfarėdo zakoni mund tė jetė. Kėrkimi i hakmarrjes ėshtė i mire kur ėshtė pjesė e njė zakoni tė mire, ashtu sikurse ishte me grekėrit e lashtė. Drejtėsia ėshtė shpėrblim dhe shkėmbim sipas supozimit tė njė pozicioni pushteti afėrsisht tė barabartė: prandaj hakmarrja i pėrket qė nė fillesėn e vet sferės sė drejtėsisė dhe ėshtė njė shkėmbim. (NIETZSCHE (1996 [1986]: 49-51). Ekuilibri ėshtė nė kėtė mėnyrė njė koncept shumė i rėndėsishėm pėr teorinė mė tė vjetėr tė sė drejtės dhe moralitetit: ekuilibri ėshtė baza e drejtėsisė. Kur drejtėsia antike pėrcaktonte se "njė sy pėr njė sy, njė dhėmb pėr njė dhėmb" ajo nėnkuptonte se ekuilibri ka qenė arritur dhe kėrkon nėpėrmjet saj shpagim pėr ta ruajtur atė: kėshtu, kur njė njeri tani kalon cakun kundėr tjetrit, ky nuk merr mė hak mbi te me armiqėsi tė verbėr. Pėrkundrazi, me anė tė jus talionis ekuilibri i marrėdhėnieve tė trazuara tė pushtetit rikthehet. (NIETZSCHE 1996 [1986]: 311-312). Ai qė ka fuqi tė shpėrblejė, tė mirėn me tė mire, tė ligėn me tė ligė dhe gjithashtu praktikon shpėrblimin, quhet i mire: ai qė ėshtė i pafuqishėm dhe nuk mund tė shpėrblejė llogaritet si i keq. (NIETZSCHE 19967 [1986]: 36-37).

Aftėsia dhe detyrimi pėr tė ushtruar mirėnjohje tė gjatė dhe hakmarrje tė gjatė, tė dyja vetėm brenda njė rrethi tė barabartėsh, dinakėrinė nė shpagim, pėrpunimin e idesė nė miqėsi, njė fare nevoje pėr tė pasė armiq si shkarkim pėr emocionet e smirės, grindaveclleku, arrogancėn me qėllim qė tė jetė mik i mirė: tė gjitha kėto janė karakteristika tipike tė moralitetit fisnik. (NIETZSCHE 1989: 230) Pathosi i fisnikėrisė dhe largėsia, ndjenja e vazhdueshme dhe mbizotėruese e superioritetit tė plotė dhe themelor tė njė lloji mė tė lartė sundues nė lidhje me njė lloj mė tė ulėt, mė "pėrposh", kjo ėshtė origjina e e antitezės " e mire" dhe "e keqe" (NIETZSCHE 1994: 13).

Kėshtu Nietzsche vlerėson se hakmarrja ėshtė njė forcė pėr tė rivendosur ekuilibrin, i cili ėshtė baza e drejtėsisė; dhe se ndjenja e superioritetit e njė individi i cili ėshtė mjaft i fuqishėm pėr tė marrė hak mbi tė dobtin ose armikun, ėshtė origjina e moralitetit. Sadoqė Nietzsche, nė pėrpjekje pėr tė gjetur fillesėn e moralitet kuptoi se zakoni dhe hakmarrja luajnė njė rol tė rėndėsishėm nė ngjalljen e ndjenjės sė drejtėsisė dhe moralitetit, ai nuk mundi tė gjejė njė shpjegim logjik, pse hakmarrja, e cila sipas tij ėshtė njė mėnyrė pėr tė rivendosur ekuilibrin, ėshtė gjykuar tė jetė etike. Nė kontrast me logjikėn e tij tė paplotėsuar, unė sugjeroj se hakmarrja ėshtė njė veprim etik, mbasi ajo ėshtė njė forcė e shenjtė e cila sakrifikon gjakun e njė ofenduesi ose njė tė pėrdhosėsi ndaj zotėrve.

3. Teoria e Girard mbi fillesėn e rendit shoqėror.

Girard-i thotė se njė shoqėri primitive, tė cilės i mungon njė sistem ligjor, ėshtė e ekspozuar ndaj njė rritjeje tė papritur tė dhunės. Shpėrthimi mė i vogėl i dhunės mund tė sjellė njė pėrshkallėzim katastrofik, meqenėse nuk ka ndonjė rregull tė pėrgjithshėm pėr qetėsimin e dhunės, as parime tė njė efektiviteti tė garantuar. Momenti lind kur dhuna mund tė kundėrshtohet vetėm me mė shumė dhunė, meqenėse sa mė shumė njerėz pėrpiqen tė mbajnė nėn frê impulset e tyre tė dhunshme, aq mė shumė impulse duket se lulėzojnė. (GIRARD 1979[1972]: 30-31). Pėr sa kohė nuk ekziston njėsia sovrane dhe e pavarur, e aftė pėr tė zėnė vendin e palės sė ofenduar dhe tė marrė mbi vete pėrgjegjėsinė pėr hakmarrje, rreziku i pėrshkallėzimit tė pafund mbetet. Nė kėtė lloj shoqėrie, kur njė individ dėmton njė anėtar tė njė grupi tjetėr, grupi i tij e mbron atė, ndėrsa grupi kundėrshtar mbėshtet pretendimet e personit tė dėmtuar pėr kompensim ose hakmarrje, meqenėse raprezaljet ligjore janė pėrherė nė duart e vetė viktimave. (GIRARD 1979[1972]: 16-17).

Sapo hakmarrja shpėrthen, ajo ėshtė njė proces pafund dhe i pėrseritshėm pafundėsisht. Nė ēdo kohė ajo kthehet nė disa pjesė tė bashkėsisė, dhe kėrcėnon tė pėrfshijė tė gjithė trupin shoqėror. Ekziston rreziku qė akti i hakmarrjes do tė nxisė njė reaksion zinxhir, pasojat e tė cilit bėhen shumė shpejt fatale pėr ēdo shoqėri me pėrmasa modeste. Shumėfishimi i raprezaljeve nė mėnyrė tė menjėhershme e vendos me tė vertetė nė rrezik ekzistencėn e njė shoqėrie. (GIRARD 1979[1972]: 14-15).

Sipas Girard-it kriza therorizuese ėshtė shkaku real i dhunės sė pafund. Kriza therorizuese, d.m.th zhdukja e riteve therorizuese, pėrputhet me zhdukjen e ndryshimeve nė mes dhunės sė papastėr dhe dhunės sė pastėr. Kur ky ndryshim ėshtė shlyer, pastrimi nuk ėshtė i mundur mė dhe dhuna e papastėr, e infektueme dhe reciproke pėrhapet pėrgjatė bashkėsisė. (GIRARD 1979 [1972]: 49). Qėniet njerėzore nuk mund ta ndalin dėshirėn pėr tė kryer njė akt dhune mbi njerėzit pranė tyre pa njė konflikt. Prandaj njeriu duhet tė shmangė atė impuls drejt viktimės therorizuese, krijesės tė cilėn ai mund ta sulmojė pa frikėn e raprezaljes, derisa viktimės nuk i mungon njė kampion (GIRARD 1979[1972]: 13). Armiqėsia e ēdo anėtari nė bashkėsi, e shkaktuar prej pėrplasjeve kundrejt tė tjerėve, konvertohet nga njė ndjesi individuale nė forcė tė pėrbashkėt, e drejtuar nė mėnyrė tė njėzėshme kundėr njė viktime nė ritualet therorizuese. (GIRARD 1979 [1972]: 79). Dhuna e drejtuar kundėr zevėndėsuesit tė viktimės, qė largon tė gjitha emocionet negative, si pėr shembull zilinė, urrejtjen, inatin dhe xhelozinė, ndalon tė gjitha gjurmėt e dhunės nė bashkėsi. Pasi ka zhytur bashkėsinė nė konflikt, zėvendėsviktima rikthen paqen dhe rendin nėpėrmjet largimit ose ndarjes sė tij. (GIRARD 1979 [1972]: 86).

Zoti ėshtė ai qė supozohet se kėrkon viktimat: parimisht vetėm i merr erė tymit nga altaret dhe kėrkon mishin e therur. Pikėrisht nė paqėsimin e zemėrimit tė zotit qėndron arsye qė vrasja vazhdon, qė viktimat shumėfishohen nė ritet sakrifikuese (GIRARD 1979 [1972]: 7) Dhuna konsiderohet tė jetė zemra dhe shpirti i fshehtė i sė shenjtės (GIRARD 1979 [1972]: 31).

Kėshtu Girard, i cili njeh se feja luan njė rol kryesor nė formulimin e rendit shoqėror nė njė shoqėri primitive, tregon se dhuna pėr tė saktifikuar njė viktimė zevėndėsuese nė njė ritual tė pėrbashkėt, ėshtė njė forcė e shenjtė e cila rivendos dhe ruan rendin shoqėror. Nė tė njėjtėn kohė, ai kėmbėngul se dhuna e hakmarrja e ushtruar nga pala e dėmtuar ėshtė njė forcė e papastėr, e cila nė mėnyrė tė pandryshueshme rezulton nė njė rreth vicioz dhe tė pafund dhune, meqenėse aktet e hakmarrjes intensifikohen prej procesit psikologjik tė rivalitetit mimetizues. Nė ndryshim nga Girard, unė propozoj qė dhuna e hakmarrjes ėshtė njė forcė e shenjtė, e cila rivendos dhe ruan rendin shoqėror nė njė shoqėri pa pushtet shtetėror.

Diskutim.

Megjithėse nuk ėshtė e mundur tė tregojmė pėrfundimisht se si kanė prejardhur konceptet etike tė Kanunit, ne mund tė jemi nė gjendje tė hamendėsojmė ngjarjet e moēme tė cilat kanė nxitur procesin evolucionar tė mendimeve fetare dhe mitike nė qėniet njerėzore, duke e mbėshtetur nė strukturėn etike tė Kanunit tė propozuar kėtu. Figura 1 sugjeron qė konceptet e "gjakut", "mikut (mikut-zot)" dhe "ushqimit" (commensality) pėrbėjnė bazėn e strukturės etike tė Kanunit. Nė qoftė se ne supozojmė se ngjarjet e moēme, tė cilat evokojnė mendime simbolike me mendjemprehtėsi fetare nė qėniet njerėzore, duhet tė konsistojnė nė pėrvoja tė rėndėsishme si pėr shembull uri, sėmundje, lėndime, gjakderdhje, vdekje, pushtet tė dhunshėm tė natyrės etj., tė cilat kėrcėnojnė vetė ekzistencėn e tyre, nga kjo del se konceptet etike dhe fetare tė "Gjakut", "Mikut" dhe "Ushqimit", kanė lindur njė lidhjeme tė moēmen, pėrvojėn kritike tė qėnieve njerėzore, mbasi "gjaku ėshtė i lidhur nė mėnyrė tė dukshme me pėrvojat e vdekjes pėr shkak tė plagėve dhe gjakderdhjes, "miku" me pėrvojat e vdekjes pėr shkak tė dhunės sė njerėzve tė tjerė, "ushqimi" me pėrvojat e urisė dhe vdekjes pėr shkak tė vdekjes pėr shkak tė mungesės sė ushqimit (YAMAMOTO 1994: 234-239).

Koncepti i "Mikut" dhe tradita e mikpritjes nuk gjenden vetėm nė Shqipėri dhe nė japonezėt e lashtė, por ato kanė qenė pėrhapur gjėrėsisht nė territorin masiv tė Euro-Azisė dhe kontinente tė tjera qė prej kohėsh qė nuk mbahen mend. Koncepti i "Mikut" dhe tradita e mikpritjes duhet tė ēiftėzohet me "Ushqimin", mbasi nuk ka mikpritje pa ushqim. Ėshtė shkruar mė Testamentin e Vjetėr tė Bibles se, Zoti shfaqet si disa miq qė vizitojnė Abrahamin, i cili i trajton ato me njė ushqim tė shijshėm. Dy lajmėtarė tė Zotit vizitojnė Njeriun e Keq nė njė pėrpjekje pėr ta shpėtuar atė dhe familjen e tij kur Sodom-i ėshtė shkatėrruar. Njėriu i Lig u ofron atyre njė strehė dhe gosti. Aristofani shkruan nė komedinė e tij, "Bretkosat", se njė njeri qė i bėn njė tė keqe njė miku pėrpėlitet masivisht nė baltė, dhe kur vdes ai qelbet. Kjo tregon se t'i bėsh keq njė miku nė Greqinė e lashtė konsiderohej njė vepėr joetike, e cila duhej tė ndėshkohej rreptėsisht. (ARISTOPHANES 1962: 373). Ligjet e Manu-sė diktojnė se njė mik i cili vjen me perėndimin e diellit nė mbrėmje nuk duhet tė kthehet mbrapsht nga i zoti i shtėpisė dhe duhet tė lejohet tė qėndrojė nė shtėpinė e tij e t'i shėrbehet me ushqim. Atėherė i zoti i shtėpisė fiton pasuri, njė reputacion tė mirė, jetė tė gjatė dhe pushim nė qiell prej mikut tė nderuar. (THE LAWS OF MANU 1991:III 105-107) Marco Polo pėrshkruan zakonin e Tibetit, sipas tė cilit, kur njė i huaj viziton njė fshat Tibetian, njerėzit i ofrojnė vajzat e tyre atij, dhe ky lejohet tė flejė me njė grua prej tyre. Sipas Marco Polo-s, gruaja mė tė cilin kanė fjetur pjesa mė e madhe e burrave ēmohet mė shumė, meqenėse supozohet se ajo ėshtė mė e favorizuara prej zotėrve. (POLO 1958: 172-173) Kjo tregon se Tibetianėt e konsideronin tė huajin si njė lloj zoti. Njė pėrhapje kaq e gjėrė e koncepteve tė ngjashme sugjeron se konceptet e "Mikut" dhe "Ushqimit", si dhe tradita e mikpritjes mund tė jenė dukuri qė gjinden universalisht nė shoqėritė njerėzore tė kohėve antike. […]

Nė kėtė kumtesė, u pėrpoqa tė gjej fillesėn e etikės dhe rendit shoqėror nė njė shoqėri pa pushtet shtetėror. Krahasimi i strukturės etike tė Kanunit me atė tė njė shoqėrie pagane pa pushtet shtetėror, dhe analizat kritike tė teorive tė Hobbes, Rousseau, Nietzsche dhe Girard mė shpien tė propozoj njė teori tė re, e cila ngulmon nė idenė se njė shoqėri pa pushtet shtetėror ka etikė dhe rend shoqėror, qė zhvillohen nė mėnyrė tė vetvetishme nė bazė tė besimeve fetare pagane. Hakmarrja e ndjekur nga pala e ofenduar ėshtė sanksioni mė i fundit pėr tė rivendosur dhe mbajtur rendin shoqėror nė njė shoqėri pa pushtet shtetėror, mėqenėse njerėzit nė kėtė bashkėsi i referohen asaj si njė forcė e shenjtė e dhėnė prej zotėrve. Unė gjithashtu sugjeroj qė etika e shoqėrive pa pushtet shtetėror, si pėr shembull shoqėria e lashtė, shoqėria primitive dhe shoqėria fisnore, kanė tė njėjtėn strukture si ajo e Kanunit, dhe konsiston nė "Besėn", "Gjakun", "Nderin", "Mikun", "Ushqimin", dhe "Hakmarrjen". Meqenėse kėto koncepte janė tė lidhura me ndijimet trupore, emocionet dhe zakonet primitive, tė cilat pėrfaqėsojnė natyrėn e qėnieve njerėzore, etika e njė shoqėrie pa pushtet shtetėror ėshtė mė e lidhur drejtėpėrdrejtė mė natyrėn e qėnieve njerėzore, se sa me atė tė njė shoqėrie me pushtet shtetėror, e cila nuk e pranon hakmarrjen e ndėrmarrė nga pala e ofenduar si njė sanksion tė drejtė. Njė shoqėri pa pushtet shtetėror nuk ėshtė njė shoqėri arkaike qė po zhduket mė shpejtėsi nga sipėrfaqja e Tokės, por njė shoqėri me njė sistem vlerash tė pėrcaktuara dhe tė vetėpėrjetuese, e cila ėshtė thelbėsisht e njėvlershme, po ashtu edhe antitetike me atė tė njė shoqėrie me pushtet shtetėror.

Supozohet se para se ndonjė pushtet shtetėror tė jetė shfaqur nė shoqėrinė njerėzore, qėniet njerėzore kanė jetuar me njė sistem vlerash, i cili e konsideron hakmarrjen si njė akt drejtėsie. Ky system vlerash pėrcaktohet nga kushti shoqėror, ku nuk ekziston ndonjė pushtet gjyqėsor pėr tė ndėshkuar ofenduesin, perveē hakmarrjes sė ndėrmarrė prej palės sė dėmtuar. Nė kėto shoqėri ka pak hapėsirė pėr ekzistencėn e sistemeve tė tjera vlerash, veēanėrisht pėr atė qė ndalon hakmarrjen. Kur arrihet tė themelohet nė mėnyrė tė qendrueshme njė pushtet shtetėror me autoritetin e duhur, nė gjendje tė imponojė vendime gjyqėsore dhe tė ndėshkojė ofendues, atėherė njerėzit janė tė gatshėm t'ia delegojnė tė drejtat e hakmarrjes pushtetit shtetėror. Kurdoherė qė pushteti shtetėror ėshtė i dobėt ose qendron nė hije, njerėzit janė tė etur tė kenė tė drejtat e hakmarrjes nė duart e tyre, gjė qė shkakton ringjalljen e sistemit tė vlerave tė njė shoqėrie pa pushtet shtetėror.

Unė mendoj se ndryshimet kulturore nė mes kombeve, grupeve etnike ose grupeve tė ndryshme njerėzore, si dhe identiteteteve rezultante tė kėtyre grupeve, qė formohen tranversalisht pėrtej sistemeve tė farefisnisė, janė baza mbi tė cilėn ngrihet njė shoqėri me pushtet shtetėror. Nė qoftė se njerėzit nė njė shoqėri, me pushtet shtetėror humbasin ndryshimet kulturore dhe identitetin, gjė qė u bėn atyre tė mundur tė ndėrtojnė marrėdhėnie pėrtej sistemeve farefisnore, themeli i funksionimit tė pushtetit shtetėror bėhet i dobėt dhe i paqėndrueshėm. Nė shoqėrinė e sotme moderne me pushtet shtetėror ku njerėzit marrin tė njėjtat lloje informacioni dhe njohurish nėpėrmjet internetit, TV dhe mass-medias, kultura e grupeve tė ndryshme priret tė humbasė origjinalitetin dhe identitetin e tyre. Nė qoftė se qėniet njerėzore nė tė gjithė botėn ndajnė tė njėjtin informacion dhe tė njėjtat njohuri pėr njė kohė mjaft tė gjatė pėr tė humbur ndryshimet kulturore, ato do tė fillonin tė shfaqnin ndjenja tė ngjashme, mėnyra tė ngjashme tė menduari, dhe modele tė ngjashme sjelljeje. Kėshtu globalizimi dhe homogjenizimi i botės mund t'u shkaktojė nė mėnyrė ironike qėnieve njerėzore humbjen e bazamentit tė njė shoqėrie me pushtet shtetėror, e cila pėrfundimisht rezulton nė ardhjen e njė tipi tė ri shoqėrie ku sistemi i vlerave i njė shoqėrie pa pushtet shtetėror mund tė jetė mbizotėrues. Prandaj unė mendoj qė etika e njė shoqėrie pa pushtet shtetėror, tė pėrfaqėsuar prej Kanunit, nuk ėshtė njė sistem i vlerave tė sė kaluarės, por njė system vlerash qė do tė bėhet fakt nė tė ardhmen e qėnieve njerėzore.

Abstract

The Gheg tribes in the northern highlands of Albania have a customary code known as the Kanun. In a tribal society such as that of northern Albania, where the judicial system does not function well, an act of revenge prosecuted by the offended party is the ultimate sanction to punish an offender or an offending party, which is indispensable to restore and keep social order in human society. In northern Albania, an act of revenge against an offender who commits misdeeds which theKanun regards as unethical is deemed to be an act of justice.

How ethics and social order in a society without state power originate and develop is one of the enigmas which human beings have tried to solve for a long time. It is reasonably assumed that before a state power appeared in human society, human beings had lived in a society without state power. Thomas Hobbes first indicated that a social contract is the origin of social order in a society without state power. Rousseau, Nietzsche and Girard proposed theories on the origin of social order after Hobbes's social contract theory. However, all these theories seem to have failed to find out that a society without state power has its own ethics, which has spontaneously developed as a result of a pagan culture.

The tribal society of northem Albania, where the Kanun exerts normative power in place of the state power has ethics and social order of its own making. In the present paper, I will clarify the ethical concepts of the Kanun and propose a new theory on the origin of ethics and social order in human society, using the ethical structure of the Kanun.

The northern part of Albania consists of high mountainous terrain with deep gorges except for a narrow strip along the Adriatic coast. The people in this area, who speak thc Gheg dialect, had retained tribal structures based on the family (shpi), brotherhood (vllazni) and the clan (fìs) until the Albanian dictator, Enver Hoxha destroyed it after World War II. The northern highlands of Albania had been subject to the tribal customary code called the Kanun since the Middle Ages. The Kanun had been orally transmitted among the Albanian clans until the Franciscan father, Shtjefėn Gjeēov eventually compiled the code, which was posthumously published in I933 under the title of Kanuni i Lekė Dukagjinit (Lopasic 1992: 89-105).

Ethical concepts of the Kanun.

The Kanun compiled by Shtjefėn Gjeēov consists of I263 articles. Since Article 1181 is the same as 1081, there are actually I262 articles (GJEÇOV 1989 [I933]:198, 208). The most salient feature of the Kanun is that it allows men to take revenge, which functions as a sanction against the infringement on the rights of others. Unless an act of revenge carried out by the offended party is endorsed by ethical concepts, il results in vicious, endless violence. The fact that for several centuries the Kanun has been functioning in northern Albania and Kosovo as a customary code, which enables people to preserve social order by resolving conflicts in the community, indicates that the people in these areas regard the act of revenge, dictated in the Kanun, as an ethical action. Apparently the concept of revenge is the cornerstone which can potentially unravel the ethical structure of the Kanun.

As the Kanun explicitly dictates that lost blood must be avenged, it is clear that revenge is coupled with the concept of "blood". The search for the causes of such retaliatory violence, which consequently results in bloodshed, would provide us with a clue to the concepts which frame the ethical structure of the Kanun. It is easy to find that four concepts, "oath", "besa" (besa is an oath of ceasc-fire), "honor" and "guest" are associated with "revenge". For example, when a man is insulted, he has every right to restore his honor by killing the offender. When a man or a guest is killed, the spilt blood must be avenged. Thus, all four concepts, "oath", "besa", "honor" and "guest" would converge on the ,"blood" through vengeful violence.

What is the ethical background that persuades a man to kill an offender when he is dishonored? Why is a man obliged to seek revenge when his guest is killed? When we try to understand the ethical structure of the Kanun using six concepts: "oath", "besa", "blood","honor", "guest" and "revenge", we fail to do it because we lack a crucial link between these concepts. Then, I found that the marebito (guest-god) theory proposed by Shinobu Orikuchi, a Japanese folklorist and writer, was a clue to solving thus puzzle. According to him, god manifested itself in the disguise of a guest at the religious rituals of ancient Japan. When god, in the disguise of an elder, visits a village twice a year to bless the people, a host has to treat the guest-god with special hospitality (ORIKUCHI 1972 [1954]: 3-62). In return for the hospitality, the guest-god gives a blessing to the host which ensures the happiness and good health of the host's family. In the ritual of accepting a guest-god, offering food to the guest-god is of critical importance. There are no rituals of a visiting guest-god without food being eaten in the commensality.

Albanians seem to have the concept of "guest" and the tradition of hospitality similar to those of the ancient Japanese. The Kanun says, "The house of the Albanian belongs to God and the guest (Article 602). The guest must be honored with bread and salt and the heart (Articlc 608)."The Albanian writer, Ismail Kadare writes, "..... the guest within one's gates, which, for an Albanian was sacred, quite beyond comparison with anything else..... The guest, in an Albanian's life, represents the supreme ethical category, more important than blood relations..... A guest is really a demi-god (KADARE 1990: 76-78)." The comparison of the culture and tradition between Albanians and ancient Japanese leads us to the concept of "food", which is an indispensable element to understanding the Kanun. So we found seven ethical concepts in the Kanun: "oath","besa", "blood", "honor", "guest (guest-god)", "food (commensality)" and "revenge".

Here I show some article of Kanuni i Lekė Dukagjinit which define the ethical concepts.

Oath: "The oath is a religious utterance, by means of which a man, wishing to exculpate himself from a shameful accusation, must touch with his hand a token of faith while calling upon the name of God in testimony of the truth (Article 529)." A man accused of stealing or killing is permitted to exculpate himself by taking an oath that he is innocent in the name of god. If he commits perjury either wittingly or unwittingly, he is a dishonorable man who must be punished with a heavy fine or by banishment from the community. The perjurer might lose his or his kin group's life as the wrath of god is supposed to fall on him.

Besa: "The truce (besa) is a period of freedom and security which the family of the victim gives to the murderer and his family, temporarily suspending pursuit of vengeance in the blood-feud until the end of the specifical term (Article 854). "When an avenger kills his enemy in ambush, he is given a besa of 24 hours during which he must attend the funeral of the killed and a besa of 30 days after that. He is under the protection of besa during this time and his enemy is forbidden to kill him. Besa is a sort of oath swom by the offended party, bringing a temporary cessation of bloodshed.

Blood: "For the Albanian of the mountains, the chain of relationships of blood and kinship are endless (Article 695)." "If someone abuses me and I kill him I incur blood (Article 910)." "Blood is never unavenged (Article 917)." "After mixing their blood in this manner and stirring it well ..... drinking each other's blood .....and they become like new brothers, born of the same mother and father (Article 990)." Blood in the Kanun is a metaphor for human life, kinship and blood feuds. Blood of an offender or a member of the offending kingroup is the only thing tlhat enables the offended party to neutralize dishonor or spilt blood.

Honor: "An offense to honor is not paid for with property, but by the spilling of blood or by a magnanimous pardon (Article 598)." "A man who has been dishonored is considered dead according to theKanun (Article 600)." "A man is dishonored: a) If someone calls him a liar in front of a group of men; b) If someone spits at him, threatens him, pushes him, or strikes him; c) If someone reneges on his promise of mediation or on his pledged word; d) If his wife is insulted or if she runs off with someone ..... (Article 601)" Thus when the offended party can not pardon an offender, they will avenge the dishonor incurred in the community.

Guest: "Every guest must be given the food eaten in the house (Article 611)." "The guest occupies the place of honor at the table, and is thereupon under the protection of the house (Article 653)." A guest is an honorable man who must be treated with due hospitality as if he is a divine entity. If the guest under the protection of the host is killed, his blood must be avenged at all costs.

Food: "The traveler, like the messenger, journeys forwages, and with his own food, and is therefore not under anyone's protection (Article 489)." "A gun or bread given with knowledge of the murder brings blood on the one who gave it (Article 839)." "The meal of the blood occurs when the mediators of reconciliation of blood, together with some relatives, comrades, and friends of the owner of the blood go to the house of the murderer to reconcile the blood and eat a meal to observe that reconciliation (Article 982)." "If members of the jury eat bread with the accused, they are considered to have taken the oath (Article 1068). " The people of northern Albania develop and strengthen their relationship while eating food together. If it were not for food, the rituals such as oath-taking and reconciliation of a blood feud would not be regarded as complete.

Revenge: "The person dishonored has every right to avenge his honor, ..... no judgement is needed, no fine is taken. The strong man collects the fine himself (Article 599)." "An offense against a father, a brother, and even a cousin without heirs may be forgiven, but an offense against a guest is not forgiven (Article 649)". When unethical deeds are committed in the community, the offended party takes revenge to restore the equilibrium and parity in the community.

Ethical structure of the Kanun.

It is reasonable to assume that food was a sacred thing in ancient times because food, being difficult to obtain, was considered to be a precious gift given by the god sand thus the scarcity of food combined with fierce competitions for food led to the idea that giving food to other persons was equivalent to giving a portion of their own life (blood) to others. If people eat food together, it is a kind of ritual for them to strengthen their relationship. It was also considered that food contained a spirit or a magical power that animated human beings. If a host offers food to a guest-god and eats it with him, he makes communion with the guest-god by sharing a spirit of food and offering a portion of his blood to the god, eventually resulting in obtaining divinity from the guest-god. The assumption that a man obtains divinity from a guest-god in commensality constitutes the basis of the ethical structure of the Kanun.

The similarity of the concepts of "guest-god" and"food" between Albanians and ancient Japanese leads us lo evaluate another religious concept of ancient Japan, (the spirit of spoken words). Orikuchi says that the ancient Japanese believed that words uttered by the gods or by a person on whom divinity had been conferred contained a spirit called kotodama, which is transferable to other persons (ORIKUCHI 1966: 174-240). Kotodama in spoken words, which is a portion of the divine spirit of the gods, is believed to have a mystical power to inspire a person and to make sure that what has been uttered is fulfilled. When a guest-god blesses the host upon visiting a village, he, who is a divine entity, sends his spirit in the blessings, conferring his divinity on the host (ORIKUCHI 1966: 174-240). It is known that Albanians believe in a mischievous spirit called orė, who constantly wanders about to hear and to carry into effect the blessings and curses pronounced by men on each other (GARNET 1982 [19I7]: 64-65). The orė might be a kind of kotodama, which evolved into fairy or devil. The assumption that a man obtains divinity through lessings of a guest-god constitutes another basis of the ethical structure of the Kanun. [...]

Fig. 1 shows the ethical structure of the Kanun, which is based on the assumption that hospitality represents a ritual for a host to hold communion with a guest-god. We herein postulate that a man obtains divinity from the guest-god. When a man possesses divinity himself, what he says is deemed to be equivalent to what the gods say, which is an inviolable, absolute truth. If he takes an oath or a besa in the name of the gods, his words are supposed to have a spirit such as ore or kotodama, which ensures that what has been uttered is fulfìlled. If he takes a false oath or violates a besa, divinity conferred on him becomes stained and injured. The ensuing wrath of the gods, whose honor is injured, will fall either on the perjurer or on his kin group. The offended party must offer sacrificial blood of the perjurer or his kin group to neutralize the sacrilege. If a man takes a false oath or violates a besa, blood is shed as indicated in Fig. 1.

If a guest or a man who has divinity is killed, the spilt blood is deemed to be god's blood. People have ethical obligations to neutralize the god's blood by offering a sacrifice equivalent to it. The only thing that is equivalent to the god's blood is the blood of the slayer or a member of his kin group who also possesses divinity himself. Furthemore, the blood of the killed, which deplores that the slayer abruptly severed his link of blood with ancestors and descendants cries for vengeance. The soul of a slain man never rests till his blood is avenged (DURHAM 1979 [1928]: 162-171]. The idea that the wrath of the killed and the heinous sacrilege, such as shedding god's blood, must be neutralized by an equivalent sacrifica of blood is the ethical basis of revenge and the resultant blood feud. The same construct can be applied to honor. When a man who has divinity is dishonored, it is seen that god's honor is violated. The disgrace of god, who is furious and seeks revenge must be neutralized by offering up a sacrifica of blood as indicated in Fig. 1. The most suitable sacrifica to appease the gods is the blood of the offender or a member of his kin group, which the offended party offers.

Ethics and social order in northern Albania

The people in northern Albania live in a tribal society, which consists of patrilineally organized kin groups called shpi-vllazni-fis. In this society, an individual lives as a member of a kin group. His individual rights and freedom of the will are rather restricted and an individual is expected to meet the obligations of the kingroup, which includes the dead (ancestors) of the lineage. If an individual receives praise, it is praise for his kin group. If anyone living or dead is insulted, it is an insult against the whole kin group. Such dishonor must be avenged by the living of the kin group.

Acts of revenge are regulated by the Kanun whose ethical structure is epitomized as follows: 1) a guest is a kind of god or a messenger of the gods, 2) the commensality of a host with the guest-god is a ritual for him to make communion with the guest-god, 3) the host becomes divine through the commensality with the guest-god and a blessing uttered by the guest-god, 4)oath, besa, honor and blood of a person (host) who obtains divinity from the guest-god are equivalent to those of the gods 5) when a person loses this divinity for himiself or others by committing sacrilegious acts such as breaking an oath or a besa, injuring a guest, etc., the damaged divinity must be neutralized by offering blood of the offender or a member of his kin group to soothe the anger of furious gods. The sacrificial blood of the offending party is deemed to be equivalent to that of the gods. It is clear that ethical concepts of the Kanun such as "oath", "blood", "honor", "food" and "guest" have their origin in pagan religions, whose main features are animism and ancestor worship. Durham reported that the people in northern Albania believed inspirits such as orė and had many pre-Christian beliefs such as evil eyes as well as ancestor worship (DURHAM 1979 [1928]: 121-131, 225-228, 243-258, 263-284).

The tribes in northern Albania have a social mechanism which mediates and resolves conflicts among individuals or kin groups, whose procedures are dictated by the Kanun (GJEÇOV 1989 [1933]: 188-200, HASLUCK 1954: 139-147, 164-201). Mediators usually consist of elders of a village who make an effortts to settle the disputes by juridical procedures. However, the mediators have no authorized power to impose their decisions on litigants. Whether they accept the decision or not is entirely up to the litigants themselves. When the litigants do not accept the juridical decision the dispute lapses into bloodshed. And when a person commits a serious offense, which the Kanun deems to be absolutely unethical, the offended party takes revenge on the offender or his kin group, while the Kanun allows a person whose offenses are relatively minor to pay money or goods as a compensation for the damage.

As the Kanun strictly regulates blood feuds in which the feuding parties take revenge alternately, they rarely fall into full-scale battle, while other kin groups are supposed to not be involved in it. The Kanun has also many articles which dictate how to reconcile blood feuds. There are so-called mediators of reconciliation of blood in the community who volunteer to negotiate reconciliation between feuding parties in accordance with the rules of the Kanun (GJEÇOV 1989 [1933]: 182-186, HASLUCK 1954: 256-260). The rituals of reconciliation have such strong power in pacifying conflicts that the resumption of a reconciled blood feud rarely happens.

Thus the Kanun exerts normative power, rectifying the misdeeds of the people and inducing them to adopt appropriate social behavior. The people in northern Albania regard the Kanun as a source of justice which enables their to preserve peace and social order.

Ethics and social order in a pagan society without state power

Generally speaking, people of a pagan society who practice ancestor worship feel that the dead of the kingroup are equivalent to the gods. Nietzsche describes the process of how the ancestor of a prominent lineage in a primordial society becomes a terrible god. According to Nietzsche, within the original tribal association, the living generations always acknowledge a legal obligation towards the previous generations. There is a prevailing conviction that the tribe exists only because of the sacrifíce and deeds of the forefathers, and that these have to be paid back with sacrifice and deeds: people recognize an indebtedness, which continually increases because these ancestors exist in perpetuity as mighty spirits, giving the tribe new advantages and lending it some of their power. From time to time, they exact payments on a grand scale, something immense as a payment to the creditor such as the infamous sacrifice of the fírst-born, for example, blood, which must be human blood. Following this line of thought the dread of the ancestor together with his power and the consciousness of debts towards him, inevitably increases. Through the hallucination of the growing dread, the ancestors of the most powerful tribes grow to an immense stature until the ancestor himself is finally transfigured into a god (NIETZSCHE 1994: 65-67).

This way of thinking is found in most primitive, pagan societies where kinship systems are of paramount importance. The kin group in a pagan society is construed to be a transcendental entity which comprises the living and the dead (LÚVY-BRUHL 1965 [1928]:70-71, 105). If the dead become gods (ancestor-gods), the kin group is assumed to be a divine, ethical entity because it is a commune consisting of the living and ancestor-gods. An ancestor-god, disguised as a stranger, sometimes visits the living to make communion with them (FRAZER 1981 [1890]: II 99). The living must offer shelter and hospitality to the guest-god. In return for the hospitality the guest-god gives blessings to the hosts, whose magical power of words ensures the happiness and good health of the living. In daily life, the living must offer food and water to their ancestor-gods to show respect, and to not allow them to go hungry or thirsty. If the living forget to offer food and water, the dead are angry at the offense and take revenge on the living. When the tiving faithfully fulfill the obligations of the kin group, the dead will become guardians who give good fortune to the living and prevent disaster from occurring (LÚVY-BRUIHL 1965[1928]: 303-306).

In most pagan societies without state power, revenge prosecuted by the offended party is the ultimate sanction of a wrong, which engenders the sense of justice in the community. If a person is killed, the spilt blood which seeks revenge asks blood of a slayer or a member of his kin group. When the living does not satisfy the demand of the dead, the furious blood takes revenge on the living (FRAZER 1920: 129). Therefore the living cannot fail to kill the enemy, which results in a blood feud. The idea that a kin group comprised of the living and the dead (ancestor-gods) is a transcendental, ethical entity leads us to the concept that the violence of revenge prosecuted by the kin group is a sacred forme to sacrifice the blood of an offender or a profaner for the purpose of appeasing the furious, vengeful ancestor-gods. In this context, it is concluded that revenge is an ethical action because the violence of revenge is equivalent to the sacred force of justice wielded by the gods. The concept of sacrificial violence will be the only explicable answer to the question of why the violence of revenge is deemed to be the source of justice in a society with the tradition of lex talionis.

Hobbes's theory on the origin of social order

Thomas Hobbes was the first philosopher who tried to elucidate how social order was established in a society without state power. His idea on the social condition of a society without state power is the basis on which the philosophers such as Rousseau, Nietzsche and Girard developed their own theories. Here I shall summarize and analyze his theory.

First of all, Hobbes indicates that because men are all equal in their faculties of body and mind, there arises an equality of hope in attaining their ends. If two men desire the same thing, they become enemies because both cannot enjoy it at the same time (HOBBES 1985[165I]: 183-184). Therefore, during the time men live without common power to kep them all in awe, they are in a condition that is called war; that is, every man is against every man. In this condition, there is no place for industry because the fruits are uncertain and consequently there is no culture on earth. Nothing can be unjust and the notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice have no place there (HOBBES I985 [1651]: 185-188).

A man has the right of Nature called jus naturale, which means the liberty to use his own power for the preservation of his own Nature, that is to say, of his own life, and consequently of doing anything which in his own judgment and reason will be conceived to be the most suitable means. He is also under the rule of a law of Nature (lex naturalis) found out by reason, by which a man is forbidden to do what is destructive to his life and to omit what is best to preserve his life. In the condition of war of everyone against everyone, there can be no security for any man to live out his whole life as nature ordinarily allows. Therefore the fundamental rule of reason that every man ought to endeavor peace as far as he hopes to obtain it, is to be prevalent in society if a man has reason. However, when he cannot obtain it, he may seek and use all the benefits and advantages of war. If a man is to follow the fundamental rule of reason, he must lay down his right to all things and be contented with so much liberty against other men, as he would allow other men against himself (HOBBES 1985 [1651]: 189-190).

The right to all things may be laid aside by either simply renouncing them or transferring them to another. The mutual transference of a right is regarded as a contract, which is necessary to be supported by either fear of the consequence of breaking it or a sense of glory or pride in appearing not to need to break it. The fear of the consequence of breaking contract is caused by either the power of invisible spirits or the power of those already offended. Hobbes concludes that of these two latter cannot be the main power which makes men keep a contract, as the fear of revenge does not exist in every man (HOBBES 1985 [1651]: 190-200). Thus, Hobbes who insists that contract is the origin of social order, underestimates the significance of revenge prosecuted by the offended party, which he thinks is not powerful enough to make men keep a contract.

The most important questions which must be answered upon discussing the nature of a society without state power, are 1) is it possible for a society without state power to have ethics and social order? 2) If it is possible, what kinds of ethics and social order does a society without state power have? In the present paper I suggest that 1) a society without state power, where revenge prosecuted by the offended party is the ultimate sanction to punish the offender, has ethics and social order, 2) revenge is an act of justice to restore and keep social order, as it is regarded to be a sacred force of sacrificing the blood of the offender (profaner) to the gods. These ideas are not in accordance with the theory of Hobbes who begins his argument on the presupposition that a society without state power has little social order. The Hobbesian theory of a society without state power has three features. First, it claims that a society without state power is in a condition in which everyone is against everyone, secondly, that a contract among members of a society is the basis of social order, thirdly, that revenge is not a force powerful enough to restore and keep social order. As suggested earlier, a primitive, pagan society is supposed to be an aggregate of kin groups, which are based and developed on the religious concepts of animism and ancestor worship. When kin groups first appeared in human history, it was not an entity of love developed through the personal interactions between men and women, but a transcendental, religious commune between the living and the dead. The kin group, which may be the first cultural commune of human beings, has its origin in the religious concepts of a pagan society. It can be safely assumed that a primitive, pagan society consisting of kin groups has ethics and social order, which have spontaneously developed before people in the society made contracts. I believe the Hobbesian theory that a society without state power is in a state of perpetual war to be unsustainable.

Critical analyses of the theories of Rousseau, Nietzsche and Girard

Since Hobbes indicated that a society without state power was in a condition called war and that a social contract was the origin of social order, Rousseau, Nietzsche and Girard discussed how social order was established in a society without state power, which I criticized in a previous paper (YAMAMOTO 1999:221-229).

1. Rousseau's theory on the origin of social order.

Rousseau says that in the primitive state, men have neither houses, nor huts, nor any kind of property whatever. Everyone lives where he can, seldom for more than a single night, the sexes unite without design, as chance, opportunity, or inclination bring them together, nor have they any great need of words to communicate their attraction on one another (ROUSSEAU 1993 [1973]: 65). So long as men undertake only what a single person can accomplish, and confine themselves to such arts that do not require the joint labor of several hands, they live free, healthy, honest and happy lives, in so far as their nature allows. But from the moment one man begins to stand in need of the help of another; from the moment it appears advantageous to any one man to have enough provisions for two, equality disappears, property is introduced, work becomes indispensable (ROUSSEAU 1993 [1973]: 92).

In this stage, insatiable ambition, the thirst of raising their respective fortunes, not so much from real want as from the desire to surpass others, inspires all men with vile propensity to injure one another, and with secret jealousy, which is even more dangerous. In a word, there arise rivalry and competition on the one hand, and conflicting interests on the other, together with a secret desire on both of profiting at the expense of others. Between the claims of the strongest and that of the first occupier, there arise perpetual conflicts, which never end but in battles and bloodshed (ROUSSEAU 1993 [1973]: 96-97).

Thus the newborn state of society gives rise to a horrible state of war. In this situation, the rich in particular, must feel how much they suffer by a constant state of war, of which they bear all the expense; and in which though all risk their lives, they alone risk their property. With this view, after representing to his neighbors the horror of a situation which arms every man against the rest, in which no safety can be expected either in riches or in poverty, be devises plausible arguments such as `Let us join to guard the weak from oppression, to restrain the ambitious, and secure to every man the possession of what belongs to him; let us institute rules of justice and peace, to which all without exception may be obliged to conform. Let us, instead of turning our forces against ourselves, collect them in a supreme power which may govern us by wise laws, protect and defend all the members of the association, repulse their common enemies and maintain eternal harmony among us (ROUSSEAU 1993 [1973]: 97-98). Then a political institution is established, which soon lapses into despotism, bringing misery to the people.

Thus Rousseau fails to recognize that a society without state power has ethics and social order. According to him social order is established when a society without state power develops a political institution.

2. Nietzsche's theory on the origin of morality and social order.

Nietzsche indicates that before the existence of the state, human beings kill any creature, be it ape or man, that seeks to deprive them of a fruit of the tree if they happen to be hungry and are making for the tree themselves. Before the existence of the state the individual can act harshly and cruelly for the purpose of frightening other creatures: to secure his existence through fear-inspiring tests of his power. According to Nietzsche, morality is preceded by compulsion and it is for a time itself still compulsion, to which one accommodates oneself for the avoidance of what one regards as unpleasant. Later it becomes custom, later still voluntary obedience and finally almost instinct. Thus, like all that has for a long time been habitual and natural, it is associated with pleasure and is now called virtue (NIETZSCHE 1996 [1986]: 53).

Morality is nothing other than obedience to custom, of whatever kind it may be. In things in which no tradition commands there is no morality; and the less life is determined by tradition, the smaller the circle of morality. The free human being is immoral because in all things he is determined to depend upon himself and not upon tradition. Originally all education and health care, marriage, medicine, agriculture, war, speech and silence, traffic with one another and with the gods belong within the domain of morality. The most moral man is he who sacrifices the most to custom (NIETZSCHE 1994:142-143).

He who does what is customary as if by nature, as a result of a long inheritance, that is to say easily and gladly, is called 'good' and this is so whatever the custom may be. Exacting revenge is good when it is part of a good custom, as it was with the ancient Greeks. Justice is requital and exchange under the presupposition of an approximately equal power position: revenge therefore belongs originally within the domain of justice, it is an exchange (NIETZSCHE 1996 [1986]: 49-51). Equilibrium is thus a very important concept for the oldest theory of law and morality: equilibrium is the basis of justice. Whcn the ancient justice says:' An eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth, it presupposes that equilibrium has been attained and seeks through this retribution to preserve it: so that when one man now transgresses against another, the other no longer takes on him revenge of blind animosity. On the contrary, by virtue of the jus tationis the equilibrium of the disturbed power relationship is restored (NIETZSCHE 1996 [1986]: 311-312). He who has the power to requite, good with good, evil with evil, and also actually practices reqiutal is called good: he who is powerless and cannot requite counts as bad (NIETZSCHE 1996 [1986]: 36-37).

The ability and obligation to exercise prolonged gratitude and prolonged revenge, both only within the circle of equals, artfulness in retaliation, refinement of the idea in friendship, a certain necessity to have enemies as outlets for the emotions of envy, quarrelsomeness, arrogance in order to be a goodfriend: all these are typical characteristics of noble morality (NIETZSCHE 1989: 230). The pathos of nobility and distance, the continuing and predominant feeling of complete and fundamental superiority of a higher ruling kind in relation to a lower kind, to those 'below', that is the origin of the antithesis 'good' and'bad' (NIETZSCHE 1994:13).

Thus Nietzsche asserts that revenge is a force to restore equilibrium which is the basis of justice and that the feeling of superiority of an individual who is strong enough to take revenge on the weak or the enemy is the origin of morality. Though Nietzsche, in an effort to find the origin of morality realizes that custom and revenge play an important role in engendering the feeling of justice and morality, he cannot find a logical explanation for why revenge, which he thinks is the means to restore equilibrium, is deemed to be ethical. In contrast to his unfulfilled logic, I suggest that revenge is an ethical action because it is a sacred force which sacrifices the blood of an offender or a profaner to the gods.

3. Girard's theory on the origin of social order.

Girard says that a primitive society, a society that lacks a legal system, is exposed to the sudden escalation of violence. The slightest outbreak of violence can bring about a catastrophic escalation, as there is no universal rule for quelling violence, no principle of guaranteed effectiveness. The moment arises when violence can only be countered by more violence, as the more men strive to curb their vioient impulses, the more these impulses seem to prosper (GIRARD 1979 [1972]: 30-31). As long as there exists no sovereign and independent body capable of taking the place of the injured party and taking upon itself responsibility for revenge, the danger of interminable escalation remains. In this kind of society, when an individual injures a member of another group, his own group shields him while the opposing group supports the injured man's claims for compensation or revenge, as legal reprisals are always in the hands of the victims themselves (GIRARD 1979 [1972]: 16-17).

Vengeance, once it starts, is an interminable, infinitely repetitive process. Every time it turns up in some part of the community, it threatens to involve the whole social body. There is the risk that the act of vengeance will initiate a chain reaction whose consequences will quickly prove fatal to any society of modest size. The multiplication of reprisals instantaneously puts the very existence of a society in jeopardy (GIRARD 1979 [1972]: 14- 15).

According to Girard, the sacrificial crisis is the real cause of endless violence. The sacrificial crisis, that is, the disappearance of sacrificial rites, coincides with the disappearance of the difference between impur violence and purifying violence. When this difference is effaced, purifìcation is no longer possible and impure, contagious, reciprocal violence spreads throughout the community (GIRARD 1979 (1972]: 49). Human beings cannot suppress the desire to commit an act of violence on those near them without a conflict. Therefore he must divert that impulse toward the sacrificial victim the creature he can strike down without fear of reprisal, since the victim lacks a champion (GIRARD 1979(1972]: 13). Each member's hostility in the community, caused by clashing against others, becomes converted from an individual feeling to a communal force unanimously directed against a victim in the sacrificial rituals (GIRARD 1979 [1972]: 79). Violence directed against the surrogate victim, who carries away all negative emotions such as envy, hatred, anger and jealousy banishes all traces of violence in the community. Having plunged the community into strife, the surrogate victim restores peace and order by his departure (GIRARD 1979 [1972]: 86).

It is the god who supposedly demands the victims: he alone, in principle, who savors smoke from the altars and requisitions the slaughtered flesh. It is to appease god's anger that the killing goes on, that the victims multiply in the sacrificial rites (GIRARD 1979 [1972]:7). Violence is considered to be the heart and secret soul of the sacred (GIRARD 1979 [1972]: 31).

Thus Girard, who recognizes that religion plays a crucial role in formulating social order in a primitive society, indicates that the violence to sacrifice a surrogate victim in a communal ritual is a sacred force which restores and maintains social order. At the same time, he insists that the violence of revenge prosecuted by the offended party is an impure force, which invariably results in a vicious, endless cycle of violence, as the acts of revenge are intensified by the psychological process of mimetic rivalry. In contrast to Girard, I propose that the violence of revenge is a sacred force which restores and maintains social order in a society without state power.

Discussion

Though it is not possible to definitely show how ethical concepts of the Kanun have originated, we might be able to guess the primordial events that have initiated the evolutionary process of religious, mythical thoughts in human beings, relying on the ethical structure of theKanun proposed here. Fig. 1 suggests that concepts of "blood", "guest (guest-god)" and "food (commensality)" constitute the basis of the ethical structure of the Kanun. If we assume that primordial events, which evoke symbolic thoughts with religious acumen in human beings should consist of crucial experiences such as hunger, disease, wounds, bleeding, death, violent power of nature etc., which threaten their very existence, it is seen that the ethical, religious concepts of "blood", "guest" and "food" have engendered in conjunction with primordial, critical experiences of human beings, as apparently "blood" is related to the experiences of death due to wounds and bleeding, "guest" to the experiences of death due to violenee of other people, "food" to the experiences of hunger and death due to starvation (YAMAMOTO I994: 234-239).

The concept of "guest" and the tradition of hospitality are not only found in Albania and ancient Japan, but have been widely distributed on the Eurasian landmass and other continents from time immemorial. The concept of "guest" and the tradition of hospitality should be coupled with "food", as there is no hospitality without food. It is written in the Old Testament of the Bible that God manifests as guests upon visiting Abraham who treats them with a fine meal. Two messengers of God visit Lot in an attempt to save him and his family when Sodom is destroyed. Lot offers them a shelter and feast. Aristophanes writes in his comic drama, Frogs, that a man who wrongs a guest writhes in masses of mud and streams of muck when he dies. It indicates that wronging a guest was considered to be an unethical deed in ancient Grecce, which must be severely punished (ARISTOPHANES 1962: 373). The Laws of Manu dictate that a guest who comes with the setting sun in the evening should not be turned away by the householder and must be allowed to stay in his house with food being served. Then the householder wins wealth, a good reputation, long life and heaven by revering guests (THE LAWS OF MANU 1991: III 105-107). Marco Polo describes the custom of Tibet that when a stranger visits a Tibetan village, the people offer their daughters to him who is allowed to lie with the women. According to Marco Polo, the woman with whom most men have lain is highly esteemed as she is supposed to be most favored by the gods (POLO I958:I72-I73). It indicates that the Tibetians regarded a stranger as a kind of god. Such wide distribution of similar concepts suggest that the concepts of "guest" and "food" and the tradition of hospitality may be phenomena universally found in human societies of ancient times.[…]

In the present paper, I tried to find the origin of ethics and social order in a society without state power. The comparison of the ethical structure of the Kanun with that of a pagan society without state power, and critical analyses of the theories of Hobbes, Rousseau, Nietzsche and Girard led me to propose a new theory, which insists that a society without state power does have ethics and social order, which have spontaneously developed on the basis of pagan religions. Revenge prosecuted by the offended party is the ultimate sanction to restore and keep social order in a society without state power as the people in this community regard it as a sacred force wielded by the gods. I also suggest that the ethics of societies without state power, such as ancient society, primitive society and tribal society, have the same structure as that of the Kanun which consists of "oath", "blood", "honor", "guest", "food" and "revenge." As these concepts are related to bodily sensations, the emotions and primordial customs, which represent the nature of human beings, the ethics of a society without state power is more pertinent to the nature of human beings than that of a society with state power, which does not accept revenge carried out by the offended party as a due sanction. A society without state power is not an archaic society rapidly disappearing from the surface of the Earth, but a society with a definite, self-perpetuating value system, which is essentially equivalent as well as antithetical to that of a society with state power.

It is assumed that before any state power appeared in human society, human beings bad lived with a value system which regards revenge as an act of justice. This value system is defined by the social condition where there is no judicial power to punish the offender except for the revenge prosecuted by the offended party. In those societies there is little room for other value systems, especially one which prohibits revenge, to exist. When a state power with proper authority, which is able to impose judicial decisions and punish offenders is firmly founded, people are willing to delegate the rights of revenge to the state power. Whenever state power is weakened or effaced, people are eager to have the rights of revenge in their own hands, resulting in the resurrection of the value-system of a society without state power.

I think the differences of culture, which is transversally formed beyond kinship systems, between nations or ethnic groups or various human groups, and resultant identities of those groups are the foundation on which a society with state power is established. If the people in a society with state power lose cultural differences and identity, which enables them to institute relationships beyond kinship systems, the foundation of functioning state power becomes feeble and unstable. In our modern society with state power where people get the same kinds of information and knowledge through the Internet, TV and mass media, the culture of different groups tends to lose their originality and identity. If human beings all over the world share the same information and knowledge for a long enough time to lose cultural differences, they would begin to show similar feelings, similar ways of thinking and similar behavioral pattems. Thus the globalization and homogenization of the world might ironically cause human beings to lose the foundation of a society with state power, which ultimately results in the advent of a new type of a society where the value-system of a society without state power might be dominant. Therefore, I think that the ethics of a society without state power, represented by the Kanun, is not a value-system of the past but one that has relevance to the future of human beings.

Acknowledgements

I am graleful to Mrs. Maralba Jani and Mr. Pjeter Jani for the comments and thank Mrs. Antonia Young for reading the nianuscript.

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